Southern Business Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 5

April 1980

Probabilistic Common Stock Analysis
Edward J. Farragher
University of Detroit

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Farragher, Edward J. (1980) "Probabilistic Common Stock Analysis," Southern Business Review: Vol. 6:
Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr/vol6/iss1/5

This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Business Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

PROBABILISTIC COMMON
STOCK ANALYSIS
Edward J. Farragher
Introduction
When selecting a common stock, an investor should expect the highest
expected rate of return given a degree of risk consistent with his objectives. Unfortunately, 1t is difficult to make a logical risk/ return tradeoff
decision because investors are usually inadequately informed about risk.
Reports based upon security analyses tend to enshroud risk information in ambiguous terminology. For example, 1t is often heard that a particular stock is attracuve for a "risk-oriented" o r "speculative" account·
that an investment is "relathely safe"; or, that a stock has "abov;
average" risk. These terms may connote different meanings to different
investors and do not clearly show how confident an analyst is with a
recommendation. This failure of providing a clear, concise idea of risk
associated wnh an investment hinders a rational risk return tradeoff.
Related to this problem 1s the fact that investors are ill-informed about
the underlying bases for an investment recommendation. ormally, a
secu rity analyst presents market share, price changes, operating costS,
etc., either as single-point, best esumates or as a range of values with
little, if any, explanauon of how confident he is wnh such forecasts.
It is generall} accepted that securit y analysis 1s a potpourri of activities
which is more art than science. An analyst's forecasts are personal
Judgments and cannot be designated as ~cienufically precise. Nevertheless, analysts can do a better Job of conveying the underlying bases of
their judgments and the degree of confidence they hold in such
Judgments.
Although the stock market 1s efficient and stock price changes may be
compared to a random walk, stock price are not determined at random.
The efficient market theory assumes that ,tock prices are related to expectations about future economic event s, that current stock prices fully
reflect current expectations, and that changes in the price of a stock cannot be predicted from earlier stock price changes. The efficiency of the
stock market is due, in part, to expert secunty analysis of economic informauon.
Because security analysts continually strive to improve their
forecasting tools and information processing capabi liues, the Mock
market 1s as efficient as theory hypothesizes. This paper discusses a tool
which, hopefully, will help to improve analysts' in formation processing
capabilities. It presents a methodology for converting subJective probability estimates of critical factors affecting common stock performance
into probabilistic estimates of rate of return (ROR ), and repom on a
real-world applicauon of the methodology. The analytical technique
employed is Monte Carlo si mulauon: a procedure popu la rized by David
H ertz (I) in the mid-60s in a capital b udgeting context.

ROR Framework
For purposes of discussion in this paper, the expected rate of return
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(ROR) 1s calculated as follo\vs

=

(I) ROR

DV1 + P1 - Po
Po
DV 1
expected per ,hare cash dividend during
the year
P1
e,pe..:ted selli ng price per share at end of
year
Po
purchase pri..:e per share

The calculation assumes a one-year holding period and 1s a commonl)
accepted measure of common stock return (:!)
Expected cash dividends (DV 1) are assumed to be a product ol e,pected earnings per share (EPSt) and an expected payout ratio lB):
The unknown tactors which must be est1matc:d by the analy,t are thee,pected payout rate (B) and expe..:ted earning, per share for the one-year
holding period (LP I)
Expected sellin g price of the sto1.. k (P 1) 1s assumed to be a product of
the e,pected earnings per share (FPS1) and an expected. end-ot-year
price-earnings ratio ( P / E 1)·
E,pectcd earnings-per-share :ire those used in Equation 2 and the ex•
pected price-earnings-ra110 is lore..:a,ted by the anal) st.
At this point, unkno,vn variables in the model arc· lP 1, B, and
P!E t The price earnings variable and the payout rate ,ariable arc
esumated directl) by the analyst Application ot the \.tom e Carlo securi·
t} analysis model 11lu,tratcd in this paper was limned to "mature" t1rms
w11h stable dividend pavout rates Thus, the ,ariablc. B, was not
esumated wb1e1..11,el) but rather ,vas deri,ed obJecti,el~ from the
hl\torical record of the firm. r or firms ,,nh le" stabk d1v1dcnd pohc1cs,
this variable would require subJec11,e probability assessment
The earning, per ,hare variable (EP 1) can be calculated using the
follo,ving equation (,vhich is expressed diagramatically in Cxh1b1t I):

(4) EP

'where· E
CS
GR
TA
SM
D
FC

-

Us)K~n

(S'1) - (

n((~:)

(S'1) -

· ;) ]

total common stock equll) capnal
number of common stock , hares outstanding
gross re,enue
total assets
after-tax, operating profit sales margin
total debt capital
financial charges after tax

This EPS model, an elabora tion of the well-kno,, n "DuPont" system
of financial analysis, has been readily accepted in both corporate finance
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and security analysis literatur~ (3). While this study employs a specific
EPS model, other models are Just as amenable for use in a Monte Carlo
security analysis simulation framework. The goal of this paper is not to
"push" the current EPS model, but rather to demonstrate how Monte
Carlo simulation can be employed, m conjunction with any logical
security analysis model.
Using the above ROR and EPS models, the critical variables for which
the analyst must provide subjective probability estimates are:
(a) P /E J
(b) G
(c) SM
(d) T
(e) L
(f) 1

-

end of year price-earnings ratio
expected one-year growth rate in gross revenue
expected after-tax operating profit sales margin
expected one-year growth rate in total capital
expected end-of-year debt to total capital ratio
expected interest rate on new debt capital

The mathematical expression of this EPS forecasting model is shown
in the appendix.

Monte Carlo Simulation
Instead of quantifying smgle-point, "best" estimates for critical
variables, quantification of the total uncertainty surrounding each is required. Critical variables are those whose outcomes are uncertain but for
which an analyst can estimate probability distributions of possible outcomes. Other vanables in the model are called control variables. Control
variables are those whose value can be predicted with certainty or have
an outcome which is uncertam but cannot significantly affect ROR. The
goal is to represent concisely the quantity and quality of those factors
\\hich may have a critical impact on ROR and then apply Monte Carlo
simulation techniques (4), to generate a distribution of possible ROR
outcomes.
Basically, Monte Carlo simulation requires an analyst lO:
I . Identify all variables which are likely to affect an investment's
ROR.
2. Develop a model LO indicate how these variables interact to generate
ROR.
3. By means of sensi tivity analysis, specify which of the variables are
critical variables and which are control variables.
4. Assign single-value best esumates to each of the control variables.
5. Assess a subJective probability distribution for each of the cntical
variables.
6. Calculate an ROR estimate by randomly selecting one specific value
from the probability distributions of each critical variable and combining these randomly selected values with the point estimates for
the control variables.
7. Repeat step 6 many times in order lO obtain a frequency distribution for ROR.
The EPS model presented in Exhibit J becomes a probabilistic model if
probability estimates are assessed for the critical variables and Monte
Carlo simulation is employed to generate a freq uency distribution for
EPS. Given a target payout rate (a control va ria ble), estimates of expected cash dividends can be derived from simulated estimates o f EPS.
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Similarl y, a simulated end-of-year EPS, together with a randomly
selected end-of-year P /E ratio, provides a value for the end-of-year stock
price. When the dividend and stock price are entered into the ROR equation alo ng with the known purchase price, an estimate of RO R is derived.
Repeated sim ulations will generate an ROR frequency dist ribution. Exhibit 2 provides a diagrammatic representation of the proposed
methodology.
Use o f probabili ties is a means of introducing intuitive judgment
directly and explicitly into the analysis. Encoding estimates in a probabilistic fashion is not a substitute for judgment. Nor is it intended as a
means of m aking security analysis more science than art. Rather, it is intended to upgrade the role of human judgment thus placing it in a more
visible position in the analysis.
Monte Carlo simulation, 11 1s important to note, provides an approximate answer to a problem. A problem is not solved by this technique.
Rather, a model , used 10 explain a problem, 1s run a sufficient number of
times 10 generate a sample of possible outcomes. The random sample will
approximate with reasonable accuracy the underlying distribution.

tales of Nature
In his classic article on Monte Carlo simulation as a capital budgeting
tool, Hertz did not extensively elaborate on his assumpuon regarding the
use of Joint probab1ht1es as a meam of providing for the interdependencies among certain cnt1cal variables. However, in this paper ll 1s felt that,
given the present limited U\e of probabilities in common stock analysts,
reliable J0Jnt probability assessments could not be made, at present, by
practicing security analysts. Therefore, explicit probab1hst1c statements
of economic conditions (States of Nature) are a means of providing the
m1errelationsh1p among critical factors without specifying the nature of
such interrelationships. A good deal of research needs to be done in the
area of interdependency to strengthen this weak link in the use of \1onte
Carlo s1mulat1on.
In the proposed model, States of Nature refer 10 alternative expected
economic conditions. State One indicates a stagnant or declining
economic expectation. State Two md1ca1es an cconom) moving upward
at a "normal" rate of growth. State Three indicates a "pronounced'' upward expec1a11on. An analyst should provide quan11tat1ve specification
10 the States of Nature and indicate the degree of uncertainty associated
w1th each forecast. In the present study, annual rates of change m the
DJ IA were employed to specify the three States of ature.

Assessin Pro babilities
The proposed methodology is a useful secunty analysis tool only 1f
subJect1ve probab1l1ty estimates can be assessed. Before presenting
tech niques used to obtain probability values and describing the sessions
with a security analyst, 11 is constructive to consider why subjective probability values are required a nd why it is realistic to assume an analyst can
provide such information .
A subjective probability e timate is a personal belief in t he o utcome of
an uncerta in event . U:fe o f such data is a means of int roducing intuitive
19
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judgments directly into formal analysis of a problem. For a long peri d
of time, the only type of probability distributions employed in for:al
~uan~itativ': analysis were ?bjective distributions based on a series of
1dent1cal tnals conducted m the past. Security investment cannot b
charact~rize? as
process which 1s repetiti~e over time with identica~
economic, fmanc1al, and psychological cond1ttons. Therefore, the use of
subjective probability estimates seems particularly applicable.
Given that subjective estimates arc valid for security analysis, the question a rises whether it is reasonable to assume that an analyst can provide
subjective estimates.
Most decision-makers have some 1ntu1tive, implicit feeling about the
probability of occurrence for future events in their area of expertise. The
feelings may be strong or weak; nevertheless, a decision-maker never
completely ignores the possibility of an event occurring some time in the
future. As Farrar has stated,
(If) the decision-maker cannot measure objecttvely the probabilities
with which vanous (outcomes) ... may appear, 1t would be foolish
to belie,e that he does not hold some qews on this matter and that
these ,iews do not, to some extent, innuencc his decision ... If
one's decision depends upon such (subJective) probability estimates,
it seems apparent that .
they must be built into a decision-making
theor}. (5)
Procedure for Assessing Probabilities
In the proposed frameworl-., an analyst assessed probabi lities using a
cumulattve probabiht} distnbution The distribution employed has five
fracttles. The .50 fractile, or median value is estimated fi rst. This is a
,alue that the analyst would be as \.\illing to bet that the actual value \\ill
be belo\.\ the estimate as he would be to bet that it will be above the
esttmate. He then provides ,alues tor the .0 1 and .99 fractiles. The .01
fractile 1s a lo\.\er extreme estimate Its value indicates that there is only
one chance in a hundred that the actual value will be below this extreme.
The .99 fractile is an upper extreme estimate. Its value signifies there is
onl} one chance in a hundred that the actual value will be above this extreme.
It is constructtve for the extreme fractilcs to be assigned values before
intermediate fractiles. In so doing, an analyst provides a perspective for
assigning values to the 1ntermed1ate fractilcs. For example, the .75 frac•
ttle 1s assigned a value \.\h1ch d1v1des the possible ,alues above the median
into two equally likely parts. It 1s easier to make this estt mate when the
range of values to be divided is kno\.\n.
B> assigning a value to the .75 fract1le, a forecaster asserts that he
believes there is only one chance in four that the actual value for the
uncertain vanable will be greater than the assig ned value Similarly, the
.25 fractile value is a val ue for which he feels there is only one chance m
four that the actual value will be below the assigned value. He must
believe it 1s Just as likely that the actual value will fall in the ra~ge b~tween the .25 and .75 fractiles as it 1s likely that it will fall outside this
range.
There are guidelines (6) for eliciting subjective probability responses
which, if followed, are likely to result in esti mates indicative of the
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forecaster's actual beliefs. The guidelines are not intended to improve
predictive ability . ~ather, t~ey ~re intended t~ assist in expressing subjective beliefs regarding the hkehhood of possible future occurrences. In
this regard, reliable estimate implies the value is indicative of the
forecaster's subj ective belief. Nothing is implied regarding the eventual
accuracy of the subjective estimate. The value may be significantly different from the actual outcome but, if at the time of estimation, it accurately reflects the forecaster's beliefs, it is considered a reliable
estimate.
The guidelines followed in this study for eliciting subjective probability responses are:
I . Obtain estimates from persons experienced in the related field.
2. Relate questions to a real decision situation.
3. Provide the forecaster with as much background data as can be
developed relating to the uncertain factors.
4. Obtain estimates in a private meeting.
5. Ind icate to the forecaster that the only interest is in obtaining personal beliefs, and not in measuring or setting a goal.
6. Obtain cumulative probability estimates.
7. Allow the forecaster to reserve the right to c hange first estimates.
It is assumed that subjective probability estimates are most reliable
when obtained in the context of a real decision situation with which the
subject is currently involved. Therefore, an experienced security analyst
(7) was asked to provide estimates for two common stocks which he
followed (8). Within six months of the date of actual probability esumation, he had prepared detailed reports on both securities, and was closely
following one of the stock s at the time of probability assessment. The
stock not being closely followed was considered to determine whether
subjective estimation is adversely affected when current involvement is
not a factor.
The analyst was provided with historical data for each of the critical
variables. Although historical data loses some of ns value with the
changing of economic condn ions, it does provide an obJect1ve point of
reference for estimation of future values. This background data, specific
to each critical variable and the analyst's personal knowledge of both
securities, hopefully, provided a solid basis for making reliable subjective estimates.
The use of a private meeting eliminates group pressures which may
bias a person's response, and helps overcome the vague notion most
people have regarding probabilistic estimat1on. Unless a person 1s expenenced in subJective probability estimat1on, ll seems imperat1ve that
estimates be obtained in a direct interview. In a personal meeting. the interviewer is able to immediately detect and call attenuon to any 111consistencies which might develop.
A subject who feels jeopardized is not likely to provide responses
which are representative of his true beliefs. He may tend 10 respond in a
manner which he feels is appealing to the interviewer, but is not
necessarily indicative of his personal beliefs. Therefore, it is necessary to
impress on the subject that the only interest is in obtaining personal
beliefs and not in measuring or setting a goal. It is useful to indicate that
the interview is not a test of knowledge and that there is no correct
answer.
23

Meetings with the Analyst

Ove~ a three-~onth peri_od several meetin~~ w~re held with the analyst.
The first meeting was intended to fam1hanze him with the EPS
framework and the concept of subjective probability estimation. The
critical variables were familiar to the analyst. Consequently, he was able
to understand the system without difficulty. The analyst was familiar
with the idea of subjective probability estimation, but did not use it in his
work. He indicated that frequently the chance of a variable having a particular value was considered implicitly, but was never explicitly provided
for in calculations or discussed in written reports. Use was made of a low
- medium - high estimation technique, but probabilities were never explicitly assigned to the likelihood of the low, medium, or high outcomes.
A second meeting was used to accustom the analyst with the methods
employed for obtaining subjective probability estimates. Overall, he indicated an adequate understanding of the methodology.
To~ard the end of the second meeting, the analyst expressed concern
over his ability to provide reliable estimates because of his lack of experience with subjective probability estimation. It was indicated that this
is a normal reaction for someone who has not employed subjective probabilities. He was assured no attempt was being made 10 measure or judge
him, and the only objecuve was 10 elicit his actual beliefs. Whenever he
subsequently exhibited a loss of confidence, it was necessary 10 repeat
this pomt. It appeared that his confidence wavered when he tended IO
look upon the estimation process as a measuring mec hanism.
A third meeting was devoted 10 obtaining probability est imates.
Estimates for annual rates of change in the DJ l A (State of Nature
variable) were obtained first. The analyst was deliberate and made frequent calculations before responding. Allowing the analyst to review and
change his onginal est imates resulted in reliable estimates.
The next step was estimating probability values for the critical
variables for the stock being closely followed. All information relevant
10 the stock was available for purposes of reference and during the
course of the meeting the analyst made frequent use of this data. As with
estimation of values for the DJ IA, he was deliberate in responding and
made numerous calculations. The analyst expressed a fair degree of confidence in his initial estimates for the median and two extreme fractiles.
A problem was assignment of values to the intermediate fractiles.
Estimates for all cntical variables were made for one State of ature
before proceeding to a second state of nature. This procedure seemed to
produce its intended result. That is, the analyst made a n obvious effort
to interrelate values for the critical variables. One may infer that the use
of distinct states of nature provided the desired effect of implicit consideration of relationships among critical variables.
Estimation of the interest rate on new debt variable was particularly
troublesome for the analyst. H e indicated that he undertook ~i~tle
a nalysis in the area of interest rate estima tion . He did not feel qu~hf~ed
10 provide estimates for this variable. This illustrates that subJec11ve
estimates should be obtained from an expert in th e related field. The
analyst was not a n expert in interest rates and, accordingly, expressed
little con fiden ce in his probability estimates.
.
As the meeti ng progressed, the analyst became more con fid ent in hi~
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estimating ability. This was probably a "learning effect" of adapting to
the probability framework. It would seem to indicate that a framework
for a subjective probability security analysis would not be operational
until after an extended orientation period.
After having the opportunity to review and adjust the original
distributions, the analyst felt that, overall, the estimates could be considered reliable.
The final meeting in the series was devoted to obtaining estimates for
the common stock not being closely followed. The same format was
followed as with the first stock, but the results were dramat1cally different. The analyst indicated a lack of confidence in the estimates even
though he had access to all ayailable information. It was constructive to
consider this security because the outcome suggests that experience 1s not
sufficient for assuring reliable est1mates. Current involvement also 1s
necessary. The analyst had prepared an in-depth report on this stock
within six months of this meeting. Yet he \~as not able to assign reliable
estimates because he was not closely following it at the time of probability assessment.
Some overall conclusions were drav. n from the ml!et1ngs v. ith the
analyst. First, reliable estimates can be provided 1f there 1s current involvement with the security under consideration. The unreliable
estimates for the second stock and the interest rate variable can be attributed to the fact that the analyst was not currently involved Second,
no indication was presented that subjective estimates were 1mposs1ble 10
provide. The analyst expressed that a method explicit() providing for
subJective probability values would be a technical improvement in security analysis. He qualified this opinion by stating he felt II would take a
considerable orientation period and a thorough understanding of probability theory before confidence in a probab1list1c framev,ork evolved. A
third conclusion relates 10 a situation in v.h1ch an inexperienced subject
provides estimates. All of the guidelines should be followed. As a person
becomes more experienced -wuh subJecme probabilit) est1mat1on, the
guidelines can be followed on an 1mplicl! basis. But, an inexperienced
forecaster should use the suggested guidelines consciou,I"., and directly
Finally, use of d1st1nc1 states of nature, as a method of 1mphc11ly providing the inter-relationships among the cr111cal variables, was successful Therefore, the lack of explicit funct1onal relat1onsh1ps among
variables m the EPS model may not be as serious as fim thought.
0 TPUT OF STUDY

The results for the common stock, v,h1ch was closely follov.ed, are
presented in Exhibits 3 and 4 . The Histogram (Exh1b11 3) ind1ca1c the
number of times that specific ROR values were generated by the model.
Abo shown 1s the expected ROR (mean) and a statistical measure of the
uncertainty surrounding the expected outcome (standard deviation). For
less-s1a1is1ically oriented investors, a cumulative frequenc:r distribution
(Exh ibit 4) might provide more readily understood information . It indicates the probability of ROR being greater or less than any specified
value. For example, a person might decide 10 invest only when the expected ROR is at least 20% with a maximum 30% probabilit y of ROR
being less than 10%. Looking at the data presented in Exhibit 4, it is seen
25

that there is only a 40Jo probability that ROR will be less than 100/o and
the expected ROR is 270Jo. If the investor accepts the analyst 's probability estimates for the critical factors, he should be willing to buy this
common stock because it fulfills his pre-established risk/return criteria.
The actual performance of the stock for twelve months after the date
of probability assessment was:
Beginning Stock Price:
Ending Stock Price:
Cash Dividends Paid:

$31-1 / 8
$36-1/2
$1.60

The resulting ROR is 22.40Jo . While this is lower than the forecasted rate
of return, it is in no way an adequate measure of the worth of the
methodology presented here. In order to make a valid conclusion regarding the methodology, the model would have to be run many times by
many different analysts looking at many different stocks.
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Further Research
It may improve the proposed ROR system to integrate sub-systems f
estimation of values for the critical variables. For example an anal or
.
.
b b·1·
I
f
'
yst
esttmating p~o a I llY va ues or the annu_al_ rate of change in gross
rev~nue co_n~1ders man_y factors before providing an estimate. A system
w~1~h exp)1c11ly recognizes these factors may provide more realistic probab1hty estimates for expected rate of change in gross revenue.
The pr_op~sed fram,ewor~ assumes t~a_t analysts implicitly recognize
and provide interrelat1onsh1ps among critical variables given the state of
~ature. No expli~it allow~nce i~ made for in!e_rdependencies. Not enough
1s known about interrelat1onsh1ps among c nttcal variables to provide for
them explicitly in the system. Further research should be directed toward
determining whether joint probability di st ributions are useful for capturing the navor of interrelated underlying processes.
The number of probability estimates an analyst is able to provide is a
factor tending to limit expansion of the framework 10 allow for subsystems and joint probability distributions for interrelated critical
variables. A s com plexities are added to the model, the required number
of probability estimates will expand. This would tend to limit the ability
of an analyst to pro\ 1de reliable estimates.
The proposed framework implicitly recognizes that, when providing
for uncertainty, analytical techniq ues are no substitute for human judgment. Superior j udgment is always required if analytical techniques are
to be employed profitably. Thus, eliciting subjective estimates is the most
challenging a spect of the system. Unfortunately, decision analysts have
devoted little time to develop soph isucated operational techniques for
obtaining subjective data. This study treated the problem by providing
guidelines for subjective probability estimation and by implicitly assuming that "expert" security analysts have adequate information upon
which to base their subjective a ssessments .
Research, combining financial and psychological theory, needs to
focus on how to obtain reliable subjective estimates. It should be concerned v,,ith improving the explicit representation of human judgment.
The goal 1s to obtain subjective values which accurately represent the
beliefs of a decision-maker. If it is not possible to obtain reliable subjec•
uve values for criucal variables, the output of any probabilistic decision·
making system is useless, regardless of its theoretical accuracy.
Conclusion
The proposed methodology provides a generalized, logical basis for
analyzing security analysis problems under conditions of uncertainty.
By applying this methodology an analyst benefits in five ways:
I. Makes explicit the assumptions underlying calculation of expected
ROR .
2. Focuses attention on expectations rather than historical data ..
3. Tends to produce better analysis by breaking down uncertainty
into component parts and analyzing each part individ ually.
.
4 . Provides better communication of an investment recommendauon
by presenting a thorough picture of the thought processes behi nd
the final recom m endation.
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5. Provides explicit description of an analyst' s estimate of ROR and
the uncertainty (risk) surrounding this estimate.
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